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VOLUME XV

NUMBER 3

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS TO THE ALIEN.
ABILITY AND TRANSMISSIBILITY OF
FUTURE INTERESTS IN MARYLAND

By RussELL R. RE O*
Seventeen years have elapsed since the author's article,
entitled "Alienability and Transmissibility of Future Interests in Maryland",' appeared in this REviEw. During the
interim the Court of Appeals has had occasion to re-examine
many of the problems discussed in that article. It is the
objective of the present article to examine these decisions
for the purpose of determining to what extent the rules of
the earlier cases have been reaffirmed, reversed, or modified
by these later cases.
INTmE

Vivos ALIENATION

A. Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests.
Because of the contingent character of these two future
interests, the early English cases treated them as mere
"possibilities" and therefore inalienable inter vivos.' However, the Court of Appeals in In re Banks' Will ' recognized
an exception to this doctrine of inalienability by distinguishing between an estate contingent as to the person and
one contingent as to an event. Under the distinction developed by this case a contingent remainder or executory
interest, in which the taker is fully ascertained and which
is solely contingent as to an event, i.e., a condition precedent, is alienable inter vivos to the same extent as a vested
* A.B. 1931, LL.B. 1927, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1940, Columbia
University; Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
12 Md. L. Rev. 89 (1938).
2 Third Report of Commissioners on the Law of Real Property 26 (1832).
887 Md. 425, 40 A. 268 (1898).
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remainder. But where the takers are not as yet ascertained,
whether also contingent as to an event or not, the contingent remainder or executory interest remains inalienable inter vivos by the prospective takers.
This distinction was recognized in subsequent Maryland
cases until the case of Reilly v. Mackenzie' was decided.
That case involved a remainder that, if contingent at all,
was contingent as to the person, in that the remaindermen
were not to be ascertained until the death of the life tenant.
The contingency required survival to the death of the life
tenant. Since the condition of survival was a condition
precedent to the vesting of each child as a class member
and not a condition precedent to the vesting of the entire
remainder, it was a contingency as to the person, i.e., the
takers could not be ascertained until the death of the life
tenant. Under the rule of the Banks' case such a remainder
would be inalienable by a prospective class member prior
to his survival of the life tenant. Yet the Court held that
each prospective class member had an alienable interest
since his survival to the death of the life tenant was an
event as to his share. As pointed out in the earlier article
such an interpretation of the distinction developed in the
Banks case would render any remainder or executory interest, contingent as to person, alienable by a prospective
taker, who merely had to survive to a future date to be
ascertained as a taker. Since the problem of alienability
of a remainder or executory interest, contingent as to the
person, could only arise where there was an existing prospective taker who satisfied all of the requirements of class
membership except that of surviving to the date for ascertaining the class membership, the application of the rule of
the Reilly case would nullify the distinction developed in
the Banks' case. This was the conclusion reached by the
United States District Court for Maryland in In re Moore,'
involving the alienability in bankruptcy of a remainder
contingent as to the person by a prospective taker. The
Court held the contingent remainder alienable based on its
'151 Md. 216, 134 A. 502,48 A. L. R. 778 (1926).
5 22 F. 2d 432 (D. C. Md., 1927).
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interpretation of the Reilly case as making all types of contingent estates alienable whether contingent as to the person or as to an event. However, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Suskin & Berry v. Rumley,6 disregarding the
Reilly case, followed the distinction laid down in the Banks'
case and held a similar remainder, contingent as to the person, to be inalienable in bankruptcy.
Thus at the time the earlier article was written, the
conflict between the distinction laid down in the Banks'
case and the rule of the Reilly case was still unresolved by
the Court of Appeals. Since that date there have been few
cases involving the alienability of contingent estates, since
improved economic conditions have prevented the problem
from arising in the usual bankruptcy cases. The only case
in which the Court of Appeals had the clear opportunity to
re-examine the distinction developed in the Banks' case,
that a remainder contingent as to the person is inalienable
although a remainder contingent as to an event is fully
alienable, was in the case of Hans v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co." In that case the remainder after the death of the last
surviving life tenant was to be divided among the testator's
"grandchildren then living". Before the death of the last
life tenant one of the testator's grandchildren executed a
voluntary deed of trust of her interest. Ten years after the
death of the last surviving life tenant, this grandchild filed
her bill in equity to set aside this deed of trust on the theory
that at the time of its execution her interest was a remainder contingent as to the person and thus inalienable.
Here the Court of Appeals was presented with the same
type of problem that existed in the Reilly case. The gift in
remainder to the testator's grandchildren "then living" at
the death of the last surviving life tenant was clearly
phrased as making survival until that date a condition
precedent to class membership, thus creating a contingency
as to the person of the takers. Likewise, there was an existing prospective taker who satisfied all of the requirements
6137 F. 2d 304 (4th Cir., 1930).

7178 Md. 52, 12 A. 2d 208 (1940).
5 Md. L. Rev. 98 (1940).

This case is fully commented on in
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of the class description except that of surviving to the date
required. Under the rule of the Reilly case she would have
had an alienable interest, irrespective of the fact that this
requirement of survival was a condition precedent as to
the person of the takers. Yet the Court of Appeals carefully
avoided this conflict by expressly construing the words
"then living" as creating a vested remainder in the grandchildren of the testator at his death, subject to complete
defeasance as to each grandchild by his or her death before
the last surviving life tenant. By this construction the remainder was held to be alienable before the death of the
last life tenant, as a vested remainder. The entire discussion by the Court in its opinion, as to whether this was a
vested or contingent remainder, rested upon the assumption that if survival was a condition precedent the interests
of these grandchildren were contingent as to the person
during the continuance of the life estate and therefore inalienable; in other words, the distinction drawn in the
Banks' case would render the remainder inalienable. Instead of questioning the soundness of such a distinction as
the Court had done in the Reilly case, the Court avoided
its application by making the unusual construction of the
words "then living" as a condition subsequent.' No words
expressly making survival a condition are more indicative
of an intention to make it a condition precedent than the
phrase "then living",9 yet under the general policy of the
8III RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (1940), Sec. 250, states that the words
"then living" tend to establish survival as a condition precedent. In Reid v.
Walbach, 75 Md. 205, 23 A. 472 (1892), "then living" was construed as a
condition precedent. To the same effect see Lansdale v. Linthicum, 139 Md.
155, 158, 115 A. 116 (1921), where the Court stated:
"While the law favors the early vesting of estates, the settled rule
is that the testator has the right to fix the period of vesting, 'and to
make it depend upon a contingency, and when he has done this with
reasonable certainty, his wishes will prevail and the estate will not
vest until the happening of the contingency.' . . .
"The testatrix having by her will fixed ,the death of her husband as
the time for the vesting of the remainders, and having described those
who were to take at that time as such of her children as were then
living and the issue of any deceased child, only those coming within
that description at the death of her husband can take under the will."
'In

GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th Ed., 1942), 'Sec. 108, it is

said that:
"If the conditional element is incorporated into the description of, or
into the gift to, the remainderman, then the remainder is contingent;
but if, after words giving a vested interest, a clause is added divesting
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law in favor of the early vesting of estates the Court felt
justified in construing these words as making non-survival
a condition subsequent.
The underlying significance of this decision lies in the
tacit admission by the Court that, where a person need only
survive to a future date, i.e., the death of the life tenant,
in order to take an estate in possession, he has a sufficient
probability of taking such estate that his interest should be
alienable. Whether we call it a contingent remainder or a
vested remainder subject to complete defeasance, the tenuous character of the interest is the same, if the only contingency which will prevent the person enjoying the possession of his interest is his failure to survive the life tenant.
In either case his share is subject to the non-happening of
the same event, namely, his death before the life tenant.
To hold one alienable and the other inalienable is to sanctify
the word "vested". The only real basis for denying alienability to a future interest is because of its highly tenuous
character. Therefore, if its tenuous character is the same
whether survival is construed to be a condition precedent
or a condition subsequent, then alienability should not be
made to depend upon whether a court shall elect to call it
vested subject to complete defeasance rather than contingent. This is the same reasoning that motivated the
Court in the Reilly case to hold the remainder alienable,
whether called a contingent or vested remainder.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals passed by an excellent opportunity in this case for examining the true basis
for alienability of certain types of future interests. If this
question is to continue to depend upon the artificial distinction between vested and contingent remainders, then in
each case the Court of Appeals has within its own hands
the absolute power to determine alienability by merely
electing to treat a clause requiring survival as a condition
subsequent rather than a condition precedent. If "then
it, the remainder is vested. Thus on a devise to A for life, remainder
to his children, but if any child dies in the lifetime of A his share to
go to those who survive, the share of each child is vested, subject to
be divested by its death. But on a devise to A for life, remainder to
such of his children as survive him, the remainder is contingent."
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living" can be treated in one case as a condition subsequent
thereby rendering the interest alienable and as a condition
precedent rendering it inalienable in the next case, how
can a lawyer advise his client in advance? However, when
this case is read in the light of the Reilly case, we can probably say that the Court of Appeals will hold any remainder
or executory interest alienable where the contingency as
to the person merely requires survival by a prospective
taker to a future date, whether by calling it vested subject
to complete defeasance as in this most recent case, or by
holding the contingency to be an event as in the Reilly case.
Probably the only sound solution of this problem is the rule
of the Restatement of Property ° that remainders and executory interests, whether vested or contingent, are fully
alienable; and that "tenuousness of the remainder or executory interest is material only in determining the value and
constituent characteristics of the interest acquired by the
transferee"."
As pointed out in the earlier article, any conveyance of
an inalienable interest may be enforced in equity by specific
performance after the interest has vested in the grantor,
so long as a valuable consideration was paid at the time
of the execution of the conveyance. Thus, in Bishop v.
Homey," the mortgage of a remainder for a valuable consideration was held to be enforceable in equity irrespective
as to whether the remainder was construed to have been
contingent or vested at the date of the execution of the
mortgage. Thus, with full alienability existing in equity for
all contingent remainders and executory interests when a
valuable consideration has been paid, the possibility of a
contingent remainder or executory interest being held to
be inalienable is restricted to the cases involving creditors'
rights or deeds of gift.
TRANSMISSIBILITY

A. Intestate Succession. At common law the descent

of real property was based upon the principle that seisin
10Vol. II, Sec. 162, p. 587.
nIbid, Comment d, 595.
177 Md. 353, 9 A. 2d 597 (1939), noted, 5 Md. L. Rev. 98 (1940).
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was the stock of descent.' In other words, descent could
only be cast from an ancestor upon his heir if the ancestor
was seized of the land at his death. Later English cases
extended this principle to include "purchase"' 4 as a stock
of descent so that the doctrine became modified to read,
"seisin or purchase shall be the stock of descent"." Thus
an ancestor who had acquired an estate in real property by
"purchase" as distinguished from inheritance could cast
the descent upon his own heir even though he was not himself seized of the land at his death.
In applying these principles to possessory estates, we
find no problem so long as the land is not in the adverse
possession of a third party. The ancestor is either in actual
or constructive possession of the land at his death and being
thus seized of the estate can cast the descent upon his own
heir. But when we apply this doctrine to the descent of
future interests, we find that the ancestor is not seized of
his future interest since the possession of the land is in the
owner of the possessory estate. Therefore, if the possessory
estate is of a freehold character such as a life estate as
distinguished from a leasehold interest, there is no seizin
either actual or constructive in the owner of the future
interest at his death. Thus, unless the ancestor owning
the future interest at his death acquired the interest by
purchase, he cannot cast the descent upon his own heirs.
This means that an ancestor, who acquired a future interest
in land by inheritance, cannot cast the descent on his own
heirs whether the estate is vested or contingent at his
death. This principle is often referred to as the doctrine
that an intermediate heir of a future interest cannot be a
new stock for descent. Since he cannot furnish a new stock
for descent at his death, the estate must pass to the next
COKE ON LirrxLETON

(1853), llb, 15a.

By "purchase" is meant an owner who acquires an estate in land by deed
or by will as distinguished from intestate succession. It has no reference
as to whether a valuable consideration was paid. See BouvIER's LAW DIcTIONARY (Student's Ed., 1928), defining "purchase" as: "A term including
every mode of acquisition of estate known to the law, except that by which
an heir on death Of his ancestor becomes substituted in his place as owner
by operation of law."
'WATKINS,
LAW Or DESCENT (4th Ed., 1837), 33.
See also 3 SIMES,
FUTURE INTERESTS

(1936), Sec. 722.
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heir in the order of heirship of the original ancestor who
furnished the stock of descent. This original ancestor, who
furnished the stock of descent for this future interest, must
have been one who took by purchase, and thus is referred
to as the last purchaser.
Unfortunately this doctrine of the common law, that an
intermediate heir cannot cast the descent upon his own
heirs if the future interest has not vested in possession at
his death, has often been stated as a rule to the effect that
in the desecnt of future interests the order of heirship is
determined at the time of the vesting in possession of the
future interest and not at the death of the original ancestor
who was the last purchaser. 6 This is an unfortunate statement since it implies that the rights of ownership do not
pass to the intermediate heir but remain in abeyance between the death of the original ancestor and the time of
vesting in possession. Actually the intermediate heir does
acquire rights of ownership at death of the original ancestor. Although he cannot cast the descent on his own
heirs because he cannot qualify as a new stock of descent,
yet - if alienable - he can alienate it to another.' This
makes the alienee a purchaser and thus creates in him a
new stock of descent so that he can cast the descent on his
own heirs." But more important is the fact that the intermediate heir can devise the future interest to another, 9
and the devisee, becoming the last purchaser by the devise,
is a new stock of descent and can cast the descent at his
death upon his own heirs. Therefore, it is apparent that
the intermediate heir does become the owner of the future
interest at the death of the original ancestor and that he
has certain rights of ownership thereof, even though he cannot himself establish a new stock of descent.
This common law limitation on the rights of ownership
of the intermediate heir was recognized and applied in several early Maryland cases. Unfortunately, the leading proBarnitz v. Casey, 7 Cranch 456 (U. S. 1813).
"See Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sen. 174, 176-7, 27 Eng. Rep. 965
(1748).
8tringer v. New, 9 Mod. 363, 88 Eng. Rep. 509 (1741).
"See Kinaston v. Clark, 2 Atk. 204, 26 Eng. Rep. 526 (1741).
1
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nouncement of this common law doctrine of descent appeared in the case of Buck v. Lantz" and was stated as a
rule for determining the order of heirship as of the time
when the estate vests in possession and not as of the time of
the death of the ancestor. As previously pointed out, this
is not a true statement of the rule as it ignores the power
of the intermediate heir to alienate or devise the future interest to another, thereby creating a new stock of descent.
However, the later case of Conner v. Waring" recognized
this power in the intermediate heir to create a new stock
of descent by devising the future interest at his death,
but limited this power to cases where the future interest
was legal in character and not equitable. The Court then
reached the conclusion that on the facts involved the reversionary interest left in the testator was only equitable
because the will had devised a full fee simple estate to
trustees, and therefore the intermediate heirs of the testator could not create a new stock of descent by devise. However, in the subsequent decision of Roberts v. Roberts,2
involving a legal vested remainder, the Court upheld the
effectiveness of a devise by an intermediate heir to create
a new stock of descent in the devisee.
Therefore, at the time the author's previous article ap-

peared in this

REvIEW, 2

it was the accepted opinion of the

Bar that the common law doctrine as to the descent of
future interests was still in full effect in Maryland and that
under the decision of Conner v. Waring2 4 the intermediate
heir had no power to create a new stock of descent by devise if the future interest was equitable but only in cases
where it was legal." Fortunately we have had several
recent cases interpreting and limiting the application of
this common law doctrine relating to the descent of future
interests.
Md. 439 (1878).
Md. 724 (1880).
102 Md. 131, 62 A. 161 (1905).
212 Md. L. Rev. 89 (1938).
Supra, n. 21.
See the opinion of Judge Rose In Shirk v. Lee, 3 F. 2d 256 (4th Cir.,
1924).
249

2152
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The first of these cases to raise this question as to the
descent of future interests in Maryland was Perkins v.
Iglehart.6 This case involved the gift of a residue to trustees to pay the income to the testatrix's son during his life,
then to pay the income to the son's widow during her life,
followed by alternative contingent remainders to the "then
living" children of the son or their descendants, or in the
default of children or descendants to the persons who would
be the next of kin of the son if he were living at his widow's
death. The Court correctly held that the widow of the son
might be a person born after the death of the testatrix,
particularly as the son was not married at the date of the
execution of the will, and therefore the alternative contingent remainders might not vest until the death of a
person born after the testatrix's death. This made these
alternative contingent remainders void under the rule
against perpetuities. Thus, a reversion following the successive life estates in the son and his widow remained in
the testatrix and passed to her sole heir, the son. When
the son died leaving a will disposing of his entire estate,
the question was raised as to whether his will could dispose of this reversion inherited from the testatrix as her
sole heir at her death. Since the legal title had been conveyed to trustees, the son during his life estate cannot be
considered to have been seized of this reversion and must
be treated as an intermediate heir who could not cast the
descent upon his own heirs. The next heirs of the testatrix
in order of heirship contended that the reversion being
equitable and not legal could not pass under the son's will
under the limitation laid down in the Conner case. The
Court first distinguished that case by pointing out the fact
that the invalidity of the final contingent remainder in that
case did not cut down the fee of the trustees to a life estate,
and that therefore the reversion in the testator was clearly
equitable; while in the case at issue the invalidity of both
alternative contingent remainders operated to cut down
the fee of the trustees to a life estate, making the reversion
in the testatrix that passed by descent to the son a legal
183 Md. 520, 39 A. 2d 672 (1944).
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future interest. Therefore as a legal future interest the son
as the intermediate heir had the power to devise it so as to
create a new stock of descent in the devisee. The Court
further stated: 2 7
"Section 1 of Article 46 of Flack's Annotated Code,
as enacted by Chapter 325 of the acts of 1916, provides
that lands, tenements and hereditaments in cases of
intestacy shall descent to those persons who according
to the laws of the State, relating to personal property,
would be the distributees in such cases. This changes
the old doctrine of possessio fratris. These statutes
abolish the common law rules held applicable in Conner v. Waring.... There is no common law of seisin
making the stock. The descent is by the Maryland law
of inheritance and distribution."
Although this statement was not necessary to the decision, it is very important since it raises the question as
to whether this Act of 1916,28 relating to the descent of real
property, abolishes the common law doctrine that seisin
or purchase is the basis for descent in the case of future
interests in land. It must be noted that this statute commences with the phrase: "If any person seized of an estate
in lands ... shall die intestate thereof. . ." The use of the
word "seized" would seem to indicate that this statute is
applicable only to the descent of possessory estates, and
has no application to the descent of future interests, since
the owner of a future interest is not "seized" at his death.
However, the statement in this case would make it equally
applicable to both possessory estates and future interests
in land.
The next case to raise this problem as to the descent of
future interests in Maryland was Hammond v. Piper2 9 In
that case the testator had devised real property to trustees
to pay the income to his widow for life, then to pay the
income to his son Raleigh for life, remainder to the children
of Raleigh, but if Raleigh died without surviving children
to sell the property and divide the proceeds among his
-Ibid, 542.
I Md. Code (1951), Art. 46, Sec. 1.
185 Md. 314, 44 A. 2d 756 (1945).
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"other children". At the testator's death he left three other
children besides Raleigh. However, all three of these other
children predeceased Raleigh, one of them, Annie, dying
intestate in 1918 leaving as her heirs a son Samuel and a
surviving husband. Both the husband and Samuel died
before the life tenant Raleigh, and each left wills purporting to devise their respective interests in this land. When
Raleigh died, he left no surviving children, so the alternative contingent remainder to the "other children" vested
in possession. The Court held that this was not a gift to a
class but a gift to three ascertained individuals, and therefore not subject to an implied condition precedent of survival. Therefore Annie at her death in 1918 intestate had
a transmissible interest in this contingent remainder. However, her heirs, the son Samuel and her husband, both died
testate before termination of the life estate. These two
heirs of Annie were intermediate heirs and could not under
the common law cast the descent on their own heirs, but
as each died leaving a will the question is raised as to
whether they could create a new stock of descent in their
devisees. Clearly the contingent remainder was equitable
under the terms of the trust, so under the limitation laid
down in the Conner case, their wills would be ineffective
and the interest would pass to the next heirs of Annie in
the order of heirship. The Court applied this rule and held
these wills ineffective to create a new stock of descent in
the devisees and directed distribution to the next heirs of
Annie, living at the termination of the life estate. However, Annie's death took place in 1918 which is subsequent
to the effective date of the Act of 1916, ° relating to the
descent of real property, and which the Court had held in
Perkins v. Iglehart3' abolished the common law system of
descent based upon seisin as a stock of descent. The Court
affirmed the view that this statute had abolished the common law system of descent as to future interests in land
from the effective date of the statute in 1916, but held that
the statute could not be given retroactive effect and thus
a' Supra, n. 28.
11Supra,n. 26.
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could not be applied in this case as the original will creating
this contingent remainder became effective prior to 1916.
This raises the important question as to the retroactive
effect of this statute of 1916 in abolishing the common law
system of descent as to future interests in land. Should the
critical date be the date at which the future interest was
32 or
originally created as was held in Hammond v. Piper,
should it be the date at which the last purchaser died.
There are three possible dates to be considered: (1) The
date on which the future interest was created, (2) the date
of the death of the last purchaser who became the stock of
descent, or (3) the date on which the intermediate heir
died. In Hammond v. Piper both of the last two dates were
subsequent to 1916, yet the Court used the first date as the
critical one and held the statute not applicable. This clearly
is erroneous. The statute changed the course of descent of
real property from 1916. Annie at the date of her death in
1918 owned a contingent remainder. The course of descent
of that estate, at her death intestate in 1918, should be governed by the laws in effect at that date relating to the
descent of lands, irrespective as to what laws of descent
were in force when the estate was created. Inasmuch as
the shares of the heirs of Annie would certainly have been
determined under the laws in effect at her death, why
shouldn't the course or basis for descent also be governed
by those laws? If this case is not overruled on this point,
then the common law rules as to the descent of future interests are still in effect as to numerous future interests in
existence today, merely because they were created by deed
or will prior to 1916.
This problem as to the retroactive effect of the Act of
1916 3 in changing the course of descent of future interests
was again involved in Marbury v. Bouse 4 where the testator created life estates in his six children followed by cross
remainders. By error of the draftsman the remainder following the life estate of the last surviving child dying with82

Supra, n. 29.
Supra, n. 28.
* 187 Md. 106, 48 A. 2d 582 (1946).
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out issue was not provided for, and thus a reversion as to
this share remained in the testator to pass by descent to
his six children as intermediate heirs. The question was
then raised as to effectiveness of the wills of these children
to pass their interests in this reversion so as to create a new
stock of descent in their devisees. Here the original testator died prior to 1916 but the intermediate heirs, dying
testate, all died after 1916. The Court assumed that the
common law rules of descent were applicable to the course
of descent of this reversion, but held that the reversion
was a legal reversion under the authority of Perkins v.
Iglehart," and therefore the wills of the intermediate heirs
were effective to pass their interests and create a new stock
of descent in their devisees. The Court was correct in assuming that the Act of 191636 had no application to the
course of descent of this reversion. Where a reversion is
involved as distinguished from a remainder as in the case
of Hammond v. Piper," there are only two critical dates
rather than three: (1) The date of the death of the original
testator and (2) the date of the death of the intermediate
heirs. Here the first occurred prior to 1916 while the second
occurred after 1916. In the case of a reversion arising out
of a will the date of the creation of the future interest, i.e.,
the reversion, and the date of the death of the last purchaser are the same, namely the death of the original testator whose defect in draftsmanship created the reversion.
Therefore, the law in effect at that date should set the
course of descent of the reversion. Only in the case of remainders and executory interests will the date of the creation of the future interest be different from the date of the
death of the last purchaser.
A most unusual and novel question concerning the application of the common law rules for the descent of future
interests arose in Simon v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co." This
case involved a contingent remainder to the father and
Supra,n. 26.
Supra,n. 28.
Supra, n. 29.
-190 Md. 468, 59 A. 2d 199 (1948).
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mother "and survivor of them" of the settlor of a trust for
the life of himself and wife. The father died first leaving
the mother the survivor and thus the last purchaser of this
contingent remainder. Then the mother died during the
life of the settlor of the trust leaving a will devising her
entire estate to her husband who had predeceased her. The
settlor of the trust as the only child was the sole heir of
his father as of the date of the death of his mother. Therefore, under the Maryland lapse statute"9 the settlor of the
trust as sole heir of the predeceased father became substituted as the legatee and devisee in the mother's will. However, the son in turn died before his wife at a time when
the contingent remainder was an equitable future interest.
These events having taken place prior to the enactment of
the Act of 191640 abolishing the common law system of
descent of future interests, the question is raised as to
whether the son is to be treated as an intermediate heir of
his father under the lapse statute and thus unable to devise
by his will this equitable future interest, as held in the
Conner case, or whether the son should be considered a purchaser under the lapse statute and thus able to cast the
descent on his own heirs. The Court properly held that
the effect of the lapse statute was to substitute the son in
his father's position as legatee and devisee, and that the
son was not to be considered an intermediate heir taking
by descent from his father but as a legatee and devisee in
the will of the mother. Therefore, as the last purchaser he
could cast the descent on Its own heirs and his will operated to devise this equitable contingent remainder.
B. Testamentary Disposition. The power of testamentary disposition is solely the result of statute and not the
creature of the common law. This power was first created
by the English Wills Act.41 However, in many states rights
of entry and possibilities of reverter are not within the express terms of their statutes and are therefore held not to
9 Md. Code (1951), Art. 93, Sec. 351.
,0 Supra, n. 28.
"132 Henry VIII Ch. 1 (1540).
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be devisable.42 Fortunately our Maryland statute4 3 in express terms makes rights of entry and possibilities of reverter devisable. The recent case of Evans v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co.44 points out the fact that possibilities of reverter
were not devisable at common law, and that they did not
become devisable in Maryland until the enactment of this
statute in 1908. The Court then held that the statute could
have no retroactive effect and therefore wills effective prior
to 1908 could not operate to dispose of a possibility of reverter, but that devises after 1908 would be operative to
pass a possibility of reverter created prior to that date.
C. Survival as an Implied Condition Precedent. In the
foregoing discussion of the transmissibility of future interests whether by intestate succession or by testamentary
disposition, it has been assumed that neither survival until
the time of vesting in possession nor death prior to such
date has been made an express condition. In many cases,
however, there is a specific provision making survival until
the termination of the preceding estate an express condition precedent. This, of course, makes the future interest
contingent; and also, because the contingency relates to
the continued life of the taker, makes the interest nontransmissible by his death prior to the time of vesting in
possession. Likewise, in many cases death prior to the
termination of the preceding state is made an express
condition subsequent. In such cases if there is no other
condition involved, the future interest will be considered
vested subject to divestment ralher than contingent. However, it will still be non-transmissible if the death operates
as the condition subsequent divesting the estate. In general
it will be noted that death alone without any other condition will normally be construed as a conditionprecedent,4 5
" See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Tentative Draft No. 4, 136, for a discussion of types of statutes and for a list of jurisdictions holding rights of
entry and possibilities of reverter not to be devisable.
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 93, Sec. 343.
"190 Md. 332, 58 A. 2d 649 (1948).
4"In the case of Hans v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 178 Md. 52, 12 A. 2d 208
(1940), a remainder to the testator's "grandchildren then living" was construed as a vested remainder subject to divestment by death before the life
tenant, rather than as a contingent remainder to a class to be ascertained
in the future. This is contrary to the normal construction of the words
"then living". See supra, n. 8. The same construction was reached in Safe
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while death coupled with another condition, such as death
without issue, will be construed as a condition subsequent.4 6
In addition to the cases where survival until the termination of the preceding estate has been made an express
condition precedent, we have numerous cases where the
intent of the testator to require survival as a condition
precedent can be inferred from the particular words of the
gift. In these cases the phraseology used by the testator
seems to imply that the interest is only to take effect in
possession if the taker is living at the time of vesting in
possession. This rule is often stated as follows: "If the language is that of a present gift, with possession or enjoyment postponed, then there is no condition precedent of
survivorship; but... if futurity is annexed to the substance
of the gift, then the gift is subject to a condition precedent
of survivorship."4 7 The recent case of Marbury v. Bouse48
raised the question as to whether survival until the death
of the life tenant could be inferred from the use of the
words "remaining children" to describe the takers of the
share of each life tenant in case of death without issue. The
exact language of the will provided that the share of each
life tenant dying without issue "shall survive to the remaining children above named". The Court refused to read the
words "remaining children" as "other children", but held
that the word "remaining" imported survival as a condition
Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Bouse, 181 Md. 351, 29 A. 2d 906 (1943), where a remainder to the children of the life tenant "living at the time of her death"
was construed as vested subject to divestment upon death during the life
estate. In this case, however, the alternative gift, contingent upon the life
tenant dying without surviving children was also contingent upon all the
surviving children dying before the age of twenty-one years. Since this
second condition might occur after the death of the life tenant, the Court
was justified in construing the remainder in the children as vested subject
to divestment by either (1) death before the life tenant or (2) death of all
children under 21 after the life tenant's death.
11See Cox v. Handy, 78 Md. 108, 27 A. 227 and 501 (1893), for an excellent
discussion of death as a condition subsequent. In that case death leaving
children was construed as a condition subsequent thus creating a vested
remainder subject to divestment.
412 Sims, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936), Sec. 351. In High v. Pollock, 114
Md. 580, 80 A. 43 (1911), the words "provided he arrives" at the age of
twenty-four directly modifying the words of gift were construed to create
a condition precedent of survivorship until that age. Also in Lee v. O'Donnell, 95 Md. 538, 52 A. 979 (1902), the provision "from and immediately
after the death" of the life tenant, was held to imply a condition precedent
of survival until the life tenant's death.
18Supra,n.34.
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precedent, even though as a result the share of the last life
tenant dying without issue was rendered intestate property.
Another basis for implying survival as a condition precedent from the particular wording of the gift is where the
only words of gift are found in the direction to divide or
pay at a future time without any direct words of gift. This
is known as the "divide-and-pay-over" rule and is nothing
more than a corollary of this theory that, if futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift and not merely to its
enjoyment, survivorship will be implied. This rule has been
recognized in Maryland4 9 but held to be inapplicable where
the direction to divide and pay over is merely postponed
to let in the preceding life estate. The rule is subject to
this well recognized exception that ". . . if the postponement of the payment is for the purpose of letting in an intermediate estate, then the interest shall be deemed vested
at the death of the testator, and the class of legatees is to
be determined as of that date; for futurity is not annexed
to the substance of the gift"."
In all of the above cases the implication of survivorship
rested upon the particular language of the gift and therefore upon the inferred intent of the testator or grantor.
Now we come to the problem as to whether survival until
the time of vesting in possession can be implied in the
absence of such special phraseology but merely because of
the nature of the gift. It is somewhat surprising to find that
the Court of Appeals, along with the majority of other
courts, has implied survivorship as a condition precedent
without the aid of any express wording in the instrument,
but based solely on the fact that the future interest is a
contingent gift to a class.
Gifts to a DesignatedPerson. Where the future interest
is created in a designated person or persons either by name
or description, so that the takers are fully ascertained at
the death of the testator, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly refused to imply survival until the time of vesting
"1Martin v. Cook, 129 Md. 195, 98 A. 489 (1916).
"0In re Crane, 164 N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47, 49 (1900).
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in possession as a condition precedent. 51 Clearly if the interest is otherwise vested it would be contrary to policy to
imply a condition precedent of survival, thus making the
interest contingent.5 2 But even where the interest is otherwise contingent, because it depends upon the happening of
another event as in the case of executory interests, the
Court has refused to imply a condition precedent of survival in the absence of some wording in the instrument
showing such an intent. Thus the fact that a gift to a designated person is contingent upon an event in no way connected with the continued life of the taker does not render
the contingent estate non-transmissible by the death of the
taker before the estate has vested in interest." In other
words, the fact that a gift to a designated person is still
a mere possibility of an estate and not a certainty at his
death does not destroy its transmissible character by intestate succession or testamentary disposition. The latest expression of this view is found in the case of Simon v. Safe
Deposit and Trust Co.54 where an alternative contingent
remainder to two persons designated by name was held
devisable although both takers died prior to the termination
of the life estate.
Gifts to a Class. In dealing with the gift of a future interest to a class, we are faced with the problem of the
determination of the class membership. In ascertaining the
membership of a class, we are confronted with two problems; first, when does the class open, and second, when does
it close? By opening the class we mean the earliest time at
which a class member acquires a transmissible interest in
the class gift. Prior to the time of opening, a prospective
class member has no transmissible interest, as survival to
the time of opening is a condition precedent. The earliest
point at which a class can open, of course, is the death of
5 Buck v. Lantz, 49 Md. 439 (1878) ; Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 71
999 (1.909) ; McClurg v. Myers, 129 Md. 112, 98 A. 491 (1916) ; Rosenzwog
Gould, 131 Md. 209, 101 A. 665 (1917).
12Wilson v. Pichon, 162 Md. 199, 159 A. 766 (1932) - vested remainder
designated persons held transmissible on death prior to time of vesting
possession.
Fisher v. Wagner, supra, n. 51.
u190 Md. 468, 59 A. 2d 199 (1948).
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the testator," or in case of creation by deed the time of its
execution and delivery.
The time of closing of a class is the time after which no
further person can qualify as a class member, or in other
words, the time after which no after-born person can become a member. As a rule of convenience, in the absence
of a contrary provision in the instrument, a class will never
close until the time of distribution or vesting in possession.
Thus, in the case of future interests to a class, if the class
opens on the death of the testator there will be an interim
between that date and the time of vesting in possession,
during which the class is open and during which its membership is being ascertained. During this interim any newly
qualifying person will become a member and take a transmissible share in the class gift. Of course his share is subject to decrease by the qualifying of new additional members. We usually speak of his share as being "vested subject to opening", meaning subject to decrease in size by the
addition of new members.
From this discussion we can see that the ascertainment
of class membership is not necessarily an instantaneous
event, but may be a continuing event extending from the
death of the testator to the time of vesting in possession.
Also we see that the time of opening of the class is the time
at which a class member acquires a transmissible share in
the class gift. Therefore, if survival until a future time is
a condition precedent, the class cannot open until that time.
In other words, as long as survival is a condition precedent,
the class cannot open since a member would not acquire a
transmissible interest. Thus, if survival until the time of
vesting in possession is either an express or implied condition precedent, then clearly the class does not open until
the time of vesting in possession. Since that is also the
time of closing the class, the opening and closing are simultaneous and the ascertainment of the class membership has
I Md. Code (1951), Art. 93, Sec. 352, extends the benefits of the Maryland
lapse statute (Md. Code (1951), Art. 93, Sec. 351), to a prospective class
member who dies before the testator and thus before the class has opened.
However, the statute merely substitutes his heirs as original members in
the class, so the prospective class member who predeceased the testator did
not have a transmissible interest.
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become an instantaneous event. So whether a person answering the class description has a transmissible interest
between the time of the testator's death and the time of
vesting in possession depends upon whether survival until
the latter time is either an express or implied condition
precedent. This raises the problem as to whether survival
until the time of vesting in possession can be implied as a
condition precedent merely because the future interest is
a gift to a class rather than a gift to a designated person.
In other words, because the testator used a class description
does he imply that all members of the class must be living
at the time the gift vests in possession?
As was pointed out in my previous article, the Court of
Appeals has consistently taken the position that if the
future interest to a class is otherwise vested, there is no
justification for implying survival to the time of vesting in
possession as a condition precedent, in the absence of some
language in the instrument showing that to be the testator's intention.5 6 In other words, if the class gift is otherwise a vested estate, the class will open at the testator's
death thereby giving to each qualifying member at that
date a transmissible interest. To imply a condition precedent of survival until the time of vesting in possession in
this type of situation would be to postpone the opening of
the class, thus making the takers unascertainable until the
time of vesting in possession, and turning an apparently
vested estate into a contingent one. The latest expression
of the Court of Appeals on this point is found in the case of
Hitchens v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.57 where the Court
refused to imply a condition of survivorship until the termination of the life estates where the remainder was otherwise vested. This refusal to imply survival to the time of
vesting in possession as a condition precedent makes the
interest of the class members, qualifying at the testator's
2 Md. L. Rev. 89, 114 (1938), n. 80, citing: Tayloe v. Mosher, 29 Md. 443
(1868); Cox v. Handy, supra, n. 46; Hoover v. Smith, 96 Md. 393, 54 A. 102
(1903) ; Ridgely v. Ridgely, 100 Md. 230, 59 A. 731 (1905) ; In re Gilman
Estate, 126 Md. 636, 95 A. 660 (1915) ; Brian v. Taylor, 129 Md. 145, 98 A.
532 (1916) ; Swift v. Cook, 133 Md. 651, 105 A. 869 (1919) ; Lee v. Waltjen,
141 Md. 450 and 458, 119 A. 246 and 249 (1922).
67193
Md. 62, 66 A. 2d 97 (1949).
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death, either indefeasibly vested, 8 as where there is no
further physical possibility of additional class members;
vested subject to opening,5" as where there is a possibility
of further additional class members qualifying; or vested
subject to divestment upon the happening of an express
condition subsequent.8 0 If it is this latter situation, the
condition subsequent may be the class member's death
before the time of vesting in possession, but only if the
death is a conditional death, such as death without children
or death leaving children. It must be remembered that
mere death alone is normally construed as a condition
precedent of survivorship, and thus would expressly prevent the opening of the class until the time of vesting in
possession."
Where the gift of a future interest to a class is otherwise
contingent, that is, subject to a condition precedent in no
way connected with the continued life of the class members,
then a different situation is presented if survival until the
happening of the contingency is implied. In this situation
the gift is already contingent, so the implication of survival
until the contingency occurs does not contravene the policy
in favor of early vesting. Yet in the case of future interests
to designated individuals, we found no implied condition
of survival will be raised, irrespective of whether the interest involved is otherwise contingent or vested. In those
cases the fact that the entire gift is contingent does not
prevent the designated taker from taking a transmissible
interest immediately on death of the testator. Now if the
contingent gift is to a class as distinguished from a designated person, is there a justification for implying survival
to the determination of this contingency as an additional
condition precedent? Can we say that the testator, by using

I Swift v. Cook, Brian v. Taylor, and Hoover v. Smith, all 8upra, n. 56.
" Tayloe v. Mosher, and In re Gilman Estate, both supra, n. 56. In this
latter case no person satisfying the class description was in being at the
testator's death, but subsequently, during the period that the class was open,
a child was born, who immediately took a vested interest subject to opening.
I Cox v. Handy, supra, n. 46, Lee v. Waltjen, and Ridgely v. Ridgely,
8upra, n. 56.
01But see Hans v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Oo., 178 Md. 52, 12 A. 2d 208 (1940),
and Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Bouse, 181 Md. 351, 29 A. 2d 906 (1943), both discussed supra, n. 45.
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a class description rather than designating the individuals,
intended to limit the class membership to those persons
living at the time the contingency occurred? Of course,
the testator could have used the phrase "then living" or
"surviving" to describe the class members, and such wording would clearly have indicated his intention to restrict
the class membership to those surviving to the date of the
occurrence of the contingency. But in the absence of any
such phraseology, can we infer such an intent on the testator's part merely because he used a class description?
Usually a class description must be used because the testator desires to include the possibility of after-born persons
not in existence when the will was executed. The Maryland
Court of Appeals, along with the majority of other jurisdictions, has adopted the rule of construction that where there
is a gift of a future interest to a class contingent upon a
condition precedent, survival to the occurrence of this contingency is a condition precedent as to class membership,
notwithstanding the fact that the express condition precedent has nothing to do with the continued life of the class
members. Thus, the gift is contingent as to two separate
events: (1) The express condition precedent as to the entire gift, and (2) the implied condition precedent of survival as to each prospective class member. This rule was
62
first applied and announced in the case of Demill v. Reid,
involving an alternative contingent remainder to the
"children" of Henry. At the testator's death Henry had
six living children, but during the continuance of the life
estate, three of these died, leaving only three living when
the contingency of the life tenant dying without issue
occurred. The Court implied survival to that time as a condition precedent, and held that the three children, dying
during the life estate, did not have transmissible interests.
As pointed out in my previous article, our Court has
never given a reason for this rule, that implies survival as
a condition precedent in the case of a contingent gift to a
class but refuses to make such an implication in the case
of a contingent gift to designated individuals. Some courts
6271

Md. 175, 17 A. 1014 (1889).
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have attempted to explain the rule by saying that "it is not
to be supposed that the testator intended that the members
of the class should be fixed before it is determined that
there is to be a bequest". 3 As a matter of fact, in the
absence of a contrary intent shown by express language,
does not a testator using a class description think of that
description as applied at his death as to class members then
living, irrespective as to whether the gift is otherwise contingent or vested? There has been a great deal of criticism
of this rule as an unreasonable and arbitrary construction
by the courts of the testator's intent. Although probably a
majority of the jurisdictions still support the rule, a growing minority have repudiated it."
Within recent years several cases have come before the
Court of Appeals involving contingent gifts to a class where
some of the class members have died before the contingency
occurred. This has necessitated a decision by the Court as
to whether to follow the Demill case and imply a condition
precedent of survival, thus rendering the share of the deceased class member non-transmissible at his death. In two
of these cases the Court was able to avoid this problem by
construing the contingent gift as being to individuals and
not a class, thereby avoiding the necessity of implying survival to the time of the occurrence of the contingency as a
condition precedent. In Hammond v. Piper 5 the alternative contingent remainder was to the testator's "other
children". Since the class description referred to the testator's own children who had been specifically named in other
places in his will, and there could be no after-born class
members, the Court felt that he was referring to them as
individuals and not as members of a class. Thus, as designated individuals no condition of survival was implied and
each child dying during the life estate had a transmissible
interest in the contingent remainder.
In re ,Savela's Estate, 138 Minn. 93, 163 N. W. 1029, 1030 (1917).
"See 2 SrMES, FuTUnR
INTERESTS (1936), See. 391, for a discussion of
cases. III RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, -See. 261, comment a, clearly repudiates this rule.
- 185 Md. 314, 44 A. 2d 756 (1945).
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The case of Chism v. Reese66 presented a more difficult
situation to the Court of Appeals. In that case the alternative contingent remainder was "to revert" to the testator's
"grandchildren, the issue of both of my sons Charles A.
Reese and Francis D. Reese". At the testator's death there
were seven living grandchildren, children of these two sons.
The sons were living and therefore it was possible to have
after-born grandchildren. In fact, during the life estate an
eighth grandchild was born. However, one of the grandchildren living at the testator's death died before the termination of the life estate, and the question arose as to whether
he had a transmissible share in this contingent remainder.
If the gift were construed as a gift to a class, then under
the rule of the Demill case survival to the occurrence of
the contingency would be an implied condition precedent,
and this grandchild dying during the life estate would be
excluded. On the other hand, the eighth grandchild, the
after-born one, would enter the class and take a share.
But if the gift were construed to be a gift to designated
individuals living at the testator's death, then no condition
of survival would be implied and this deceased grandchild
would have owned a transmissible share in the contingent
remainder. On the other hand, the after-born grandchild
would be excluded because the gift was to designated individuals. Because of the word "reverted" the Court held
that this was not a class gift but a gift to seven designated
individuals, and thus no condition of survivorship should
be implied, although the result was to exclude the afterborn grandchild. The Court was further influenced in its
decision by the mistaken belief that if this were treated as
a class gift with a condition of survivorship implied, the
entire remainder would violate the rule against perpetuities
and thus fail.6 7 The importance of the Chism case lies in
the fact that it illustrates the extent to which the Court has
gone to avoid the application of this rule requiring the implication of a condition of survival in contingent class gifts.
-190 Md. 311, 58 A. 2d 643 (1948), reh. den.
7 See 9 Md. L. Rev. 367 (1948), for a note on the Chism case, ibid, pointing out the error in assuming such a construction would violate the rule
against perpetuitles.
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Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,68 decided on the
same day as the Chism case,6 9 presented a similar problem.
In that case the alternative contingent remainder was to
the "children" of the grantor, "the child or children of any
deceased child . . . to take and have the part or share to
which the parent, if living, would have been entitled".
This was a deed of trust, so at the date of its execution it
was theoretically possible for the grantor to have further
after-born children although then 69 years old. At that
date he had two living children and a granddaughter, the
child of a deceased daughter and the life tenant in the deed.
Subsequently these two living children and their issue died
during the life estate so that at the termination of the life
estate there was no living issue of the grantor. If this alternative contingent remainder were treated as a class gift,
then the condition of survival would be implied both as to
the "children" of the grantor and as to the "child or children
of any deceased child" of the grantor, so that the remainder
would fail because no member of either class description
survived the contingency. On the other hand, if construed
to be a gift to individuals then the two children of the
grantor and the granddaughter, living at the execution of
the deed, had transmissible interests at their deaths. However, the Court refused to treat the alternative contingent
remainder as a gift to individuals but construed it as a class
gift with the implied condition of survival to the termination of the life estate, so that as a result the remainder
failed and a reversion remained in the orginal grantor. It
is noted that the ultimate course of descent of this reversion was to the same persons who would have taken the
remainder if the Court had refused to imply survival as a
condition precedent. Although the Court pointed out that
the rule in the Demill case has seldom been applied although
frequently cited, it refused to hold that it had been modified
or changed by any subsequent cases.
The last case involving this problem to come before the
Court of Appeals was the case of Boynton v. Barton.7 0 In
190 Md. 332, 58 A. 2d 649 (1948).
Supra, n. 66.
"192 Md. 582, 64A. 2d 750 (1949).
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that case the testator bequeathed one-eighth of the residue
of his estate to his daughter Sallie for life, with the remainder to her issue, but if she died without issue her share
"shall at her death be distributed among and form part of
the other shares or share into which the said residue of my
estate shall be divided". One of the other seven shares was
bequeathed to a daughter Julia for life, with the income
from the remainder to her descendants until the eldest attains the age of 21, and then absolutely to the "then living
descendants" of this daughter. The daughter Julia died
first, leaving two children the eldest of whom was already
21. One of these children predeceased the daughter Sallie
who in turn died without issue. Therefore under the terms
of the will Sallie's eighth share would be divided into seven
parts so that one fifty-sixth interest would pass along with
Julia's share to her two children. But the problem then
arises as to whether Julia's child who predeceased Sallie
could share in this one fifty-sixth interest. It was contended
that the alternative contingent remainder in Sallie's share
was to a class and that under the rule of the Demill case
survival to the happening of the contingency, i.e., death of
Sallie without issue, was an implied condition precedent.
If this rule is applied then the child of Julia dying before
Sallie had no transmissible interest. The Court recognized the fact that this alternative contingent remainder
in Sallie's share was a gift to seven different classes, but
that the class consisting of Julia's descendants was by express terms of the will to be ascertained at Julia's death.
Here the express words "then living", modifying the class
description of Julia's descendants, referred to those living
at Julia's death and not at the death of Sallie. Therefore
the child of Julia dying before Sallie held a transmissible
interest in this alternative contingent remainder in Sallie's
share. The importance of this decision lies in the fact that
the Court recognized that the rule of the Demill case is not
a rule of law but merely one of construction, and that if the
instrument indicates that the membership in a class is to be
ascertained at a date earlier than the happening of the con-
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tingency, then the class members will take transmissible
interests at that date even though the estate remains contingent until a later date.
CONCLUSION

During the seventeen years that have elapsed since the
author's previous article appeared in this REvrEw, the Court
of Appeals has had numerous opportunities to examine and
review the principles applicable to the alienability and
transmissibility of future interests. From these decisions
we can reach the following conclusions:
1. Although the Court of Appeals is unwilling to repudiate the rule that a future interest contingent as to the
taker, as distinguished from one solely contingent as to an
event, is inalienable, yet it will, for the purpose of alienation,
construe such an estate as being vested subject to divestment so as to uphold alienation by a prospective taker.
2. Although the common law rules of descent are no
longer applicable as to future interests and such estates
shall pass in case of intestate succession in the same manner
as possessory interests, yet if a future interest was created
by a deed or will effective prior to 1916, the common law
rules must be applied as to intestate succession or testamentary disposition occurring since 1916.
3. Where there is a gift of a contingent future interest
to a class, a condition precedent of survival until the occurrence of the contingency will be implied as to each class
member, unless the Court can construe the class description
as referring to specific individuals living at the testator's
death or at the effective date of the deed.

